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I. INTRODUCTION
 
The European Conununity, (EC), is moving closer and closer to 
full economic integration. There is general agreement that the 
economic integration of these countries will have major sectoral 
and national impacts. One sector that will be affected is the 
banking sector. The banking sector, or the financial sector in 
general, is extremely important; the efficiency of that sector, 
in its role as intermediary, is crucial to the efficiency of the 
economy as a wnole. 
The integration of banking systems among the EC countries 
is necessary in order to achieve the goals of European economic 
union, which include the complete free movement of all factors of 
production: goods, people, services, and capital. Integration of 
banking in the European Conununity entails the harmonization and 
.. 
centralization of regulations, or restrictions. The first step 
taken, which went into effect in January of 1993, was to make 
banks free to move anywhere within the Conununity, creating a 
larger market in which they must compete. 
Competition, due to banks being free to move within the 
Conununity, will eventually result in regulation converging near 
the least amount of current regulatory interference. After 
integration, banks are free to branch anywhere they want within 
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the EC, and they abide by the regulations of their home country. 
Therefore, banks from countries with minimal regulation will have 
an advantage unless countries with strict regulation of banking 
lessen restrictions in order to compete. Swary and Topf express 
this argument. They say that "bank regulation within the EC 
seems virtually certain to converge on a low level of operative 
interference, and a concomitantly low regulatory burden." (1992, 
p. 445) 
The purpose of this research is to examine profits in the 
banking sectors of each of the,EC countries before integration, 
and from there to infer what may happen to profits after 
integration. This is because it is too soon to have data on and 
to see the effects of the integration of the banking systems, 
since the laws governing the integration just came into effect in 
January of 1993. 
Theoretically, profit is related to the risks banks are 
allowed to assume and to the activities in which they are allowed 
to engage, which are dependent upon the regulatory environment in 
which banks operate. After integration of the financial markets 
in the EC, there will be a low level of regulatory interference. 
Those countries whose banks have previous experience operating in 
an atmosphere of little regulatory interference may have certain 
competitive advantages in the new market, Which I will explain 
later. 
II. THEORY/BACKGROUND/LITERATURE 
Banking Regulations and Bank Profits 
•
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Regulations in the banking industry restrict the operations 
or activities of a bank. They affect the profits of a bank or a 
banking system by restricting its opportunity to achieve cost 
reductions through economies of scale and scope. Different 
levels of regulation lead to different opportunities for 
economies of scale and scope, and therefore different profits, 
all other factors being constant. 
A firm eRjoys economies of scale when expanding its size 
decreases its unit costs. A firm enjoys economies of scope when 
expanding its range of activities decreases its unit costs. 
In terms of the banking sector, increasing size means increasing 
its assets, which are its loans, and its liabilities, which are 
its deposits. ; Economies of scope in banking occur when banks are 
allowed to expand their financial activities. "For example, if a 
bank has invested in acquiring information about a corporation in 
order to make it a loan, it can use that same information, at no 
extra cost, to underwrite a bond issue or to write an insurance 
policy." (Kohn, 1991, p. 498) If regulations restrict a bank 
from attaining a large size or from engaging in a diverse range 
of activities, they affect its ability to achieve economies of 
scale and scope. Cost reductions attained through economies of 
scale and scope lead to higher profits, assuming all other 
factors remain constant. 
There are many examples of regulations which would limit 
banks' abilities to achieve economies of scale and scope. 
Stringent reserve or capital requirements would limit banks in 
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that they limit the amount of risk banks are allowed to bear. 
If a bank must keep its capital level high, it cannot diversify 
its activities as much as it might like. Restrictions on banks' 
participating in the insurance industry or on their underwriting 
securities would limit banks' opportunities to achieve economies 
of scope because they restrict banks from providing a wide 
variety of services. 
Legal Environment and Harmonization of Regulations 
When the EC was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the 
free trade of services was envisioned. Until the Single European 
Act (SEA), however, which came into effect in July of 1987, no 
real attempt had been made to bring banking into the confines of 
EC legislation~ (Chrystal, 1992, p. 63) .The Single European Act 
provided for the completion of the common market and targeted the 
end of 1992 for the complete free movement of goods, people, 
services, and capital. (Keys, 1989, p. 591) The Second 
Coordinating Banking Directive (2BD) was adopted in 1989 in order 
to facilitate the integration of European banking systems. 
Under the 2BD, banks operating in the EC have the right to move 
wherever they want within the EC; they have a "single passport." 
(Economist, 1992, p. 29) A license to operate a bank in one EC 
country must be accepted in all other EC countries if the bank 
chooses to expand; banks may not be discriminated against on the 
basis of nationality. The 2BD sets forth a list of activities 
permissible to banks, and if banks are allowed to engage in these 
activities in their home countries, they are allowed to engage in 
5
 
these activities, by branching, throughout the EC. 
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The 2BD is accompanied by the Own Funds Directive and the 
Solvency Ratio Directive, both also of 1989. These directives 
define equity capital and set minimum capital requirements. 
Those countries whose capital requirements were not up to those 
set by the EC will be at a disadvantage initially as they build 
up their capital. 
Implications . 
Much has been written about the integration of the European 
financial markets, as outlined ,by the 2BD. The common theme in 
the literature is the increase in competition brought about by 
the larger market. 
Keys (1989) foresees greater convergence of national laws 
regarding banking in the EC, based on the concept of mutual 
recognition. Mutual recognition requires each country to 
recognize the laws, regulations, and supervisory practices 
governing banking in other EC countries as equivalent to its own 
in allowing their banks to operate within its boundaries and be 
under home country control. (Keys, 1989, p. 602) In order to 
recognize the laws of another country as equivalent to its own, 
there must be agreement on key issues. Key regulations must be 
harmonized. From initial harmonization of regulations, market 
forces will lead to even greater harmonization~ (Keys, 1989, p. 
602) Countries will harmonize their regulations to avoid any 
country having a competitive advantage as a result of its 
regulations. As stated earlier, Swary and Topf believe that 
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convergence will occur at a low level of regulatory interference. 
(1992, p. 445) 
Chrystal and Coughlin (1992), Swary and Topf (1992), and 
Krause (1973), are all concerned with the efficiency of the 
financial system and the increased efficiency resulting from the 
integration of financial systems in the EC. Competition will 
increase in the new, larger market, thereby increasing 
efficiency. Banks will not be able to earn monopoly profit; they 
will have to charge a competitive, lower price for their 
services. Swary and Topf estimate that overall, prices in the 
banking sector in the EC could decrease by 21% as a result of 
integration. (1992, p. 441) In order to be profitable in the new 
environment, banks will have to take adva~tage of cost-reduction 
opportunities. 
Vives argues that competition will increase with an 
integrated European financial system, but that there are certain 
barriers that prevent the attainment of perfect competition. 
Some examples of these barriers are the costs faced by consumers 
of switching banks and the effect having an established 
reputation has on a bank's ability to compete. (1991, pp. 20-21) 
He argues that barriers and other factors segment the banking 
market, and predicts that the market will remain segmented, and 
therefore the benefits of integration and increased competition 
will be unevenly distributed. (Vives, 1991, pp. 22) This means 
that countries' banks which have already been successful in 
branching out into markets in other EC countries will also be in 
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the best position to compete in the new integrated market. They 
will have gained experience operating in the markets which they 
will be allowed freer access to. 
An integrated European financial system is likely to be more 
competitive. A greater number of firms in the market increases 
the supply, and therefore decreases the price of their services. 
However, a larger market provides opportunities to decrease costs 
through economies of scale and scope. Those countries whose 
banks are better able tq take advantage of opportunities for 
scale and scope will be more pEofitable in a market where prices 
of their services have decreased. 
Banks that have not had a lot of restrictions placed on them 
in the past shbuld be in the best positio~ to take advantage of 
the economies of scope offered by integration. They have 
experience in handling a diverse range of activities and their 
associated risks. Banks that are fairly large and have a strong 
market base at home should be in the best position to take 
advantage of the economies of scale offered by integration; 
otherwise they might be "swallowed up" by banks who have the 
resources to expand by acquiring smaller institutions. 
What often impedes banks from reaching a certain size or engaging 
in a wide range of activities are the regulations that they face. 
Banks and banking systems which have not been heavily regulated 
before integration should enjoy advantages in the market for 
financial services after integration. 
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
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Since data are not available on profits after integration, I 
look at profits before integration. From the analysis of past 
profits in the banking sector in the EC countries before 
integration, I expect to draw some conclusions about the possible 
effects of integration on profits. My goal is to test whether 
profits before integration were related to the amount of 
regulation facing banks. Specifically, I expect that those banks 
which were less regulated should have been more profitable. If 
this is true, then certain countries' banks should have a 
competitive advantage after integration, because they have 
experience operating in an atmosphere of few restrictions and 
should be better able to take advantage of economies of scale and 
scope offered in the larger market. 
The tool that I use to explain profits in the banking 
systems in the EC before integration is OLS (ordinary least 
squares) regression analysis with data both across countries and 
across time. The data come from the consolidated banking system 
income statements and balance sheets for 11 of the 12 EC 
countries, for the years 1985 through 1989. (OECD, 1991) Data 
are not available for Ireland, therefore it is not included in 
the study. 
Variables regressed against bank profitability are related 
to the amount of regulation facing banks •. The dependent variable 
in my model is return on equity (ROE), which is a measure of 
profit divided by equity. I used after-tax profits, because 
after-tax returns are the relevant variable in decision making. 
•
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The six independent variables discussed below are listed in 
Table I on page 10. 
RESERVES- Reserves are obtained from the balance sheets of the 
banking systems. I use a ratio of reserves to total assets. 
Reserves are cash on hand and do not earn money like loans do; if 
a bank is required to hold more reserves, it is unable to make as 
many loans. If a country has stringent reserve requirements, its 
banks should be less profitable. The sign for RESERVES should be 
negative. 
INCOME- This variable measures total non-interest income of the 
banking system for a given year (from the consolidated income 
statement) divided by the total income of the system (also from 
the consolidated income statement). This is a measure of the 
diversity of activities of the system. The more income that 
banks earn that is not due to interest charges (i.e. the 
traditional making of loans), the more diverse is their range of 
activities. An example of non-interest income would be charges 
for underwriting securities. The sign for INCOME should be 
positive, since as banking systems become more diverse (non­
interest income rises), profit is expected to rise. Profit 
should rise because expanding diversity of activities leads to 
economies of scope, which reduce costs. 
GOP- GOP growth is used as a means of capturing fluctuations in 
profits due to the overall state of the economy. I lag GOP 
growth by one year, meaning that GOP growth in a country in one 
year does not affect that countries' banking system profits until 
TABLE I: 
10 
Summary of explanatory variables 
variable 
RESERVES 
(NON-INTEREST) 
. 
INCOME 
. 
GDP (growth) 
INSREG 
ASSETS 
CAPITAL 
UKLOANLOSS 
DENMARK 
... 
a measure of: 
amount of risk 
banks are allowed 
to assume 
diversity of 
activities 
fluctuations due to 
business cycle 
diversity of 
activities 
size (economies of 
scale) 
amount of risk 
banks are allowed 
to assume 
provisions for LDC 
debt 
economic 
circumstances and· 
loan-losses 
expected sign 
-
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
-
-
-
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the next year. This makes sense as it would take some time for 
people to start feeling very optimistic about the economy. The 
sign for GOP should be positive, since as GOP increases profits 
in the banking sector should increase also. 
INSREG- I use a dummy variable for whether or not a country 
allows its banks to participate in the insurance industry 
(according to OECO, 1992). This variable is intended to serve as 
a proxy for a}l restrictions on the range of products that banks 
face. The variable takes on a value of 1 if there are some 
restrictions in the country regarding banks' participation in the 
insurance industry and a value of 0 if there are none. If banks 
are allowed to participate in the insurance industry, their 
profits should" be higher, due to economies of scope. The sign 
for INSREG should be negative, due to the way I set up the 
variable. 
ASSETS- This variable is used as a measure of the average size 
of banks in the banking system, and comes from the consolidated 
balance sheets of the banking systems. It is the total assets of 
the consolidated banking system of a country for a given year, 
divided by the number of banks. The sign for this variable 
should be positive, since profits should be expected to 
increase as the average size of banks in the system increases. 
Large banks have better opportunities for economies of scale. 
CAPITAL- Capital is another word for equity. I use a ratio of 
capital over total assets, found in the balance sheets for each 
countries' banks. If a country has stringent capital (or equity) 
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requirements in relation to assets for its banks, its banks 
should be less able to be profitable, in terms of profit divided 
by equity. They are also less able to be profitable because 
they are not allowed to take on as much risk; lending and other 
opportunities are restricted. Thus, the sign for CAPITAL should 
be negative. 
UKLOANLOSS- This is another dummy variable. When profits are 
plotted ove~ ~ime for the banking systems in each of the EC 
countries, profits in tne UK are puzzling (see figures I and II). 
In the years 1987 and 1989, profits fell to virtually nothing. 
My research reveals that during those two years, banks in the UK 
made huge provisions for LDC debt which was no longer good debt. 
(Swary & Topf,' 1992, p. 169) The UKLOANLOSS variable is set up 
to take into account these provisions. It has a value of 0 for 
every country and every year except for the UK in the years 1987 
and 1989. This variable should have a negative sign, because 
provisions for LDC debt caused profits to fall dramatically. 
DENMARK- This is also a dummy variable, set up to take into 
account special circumstances which affected profits in the 
banking sector in Denmark (see figure I). Starting in 1986, 
profits fell sharply. The Danish economy fell into a recession, 
and banks started accumulating losses on domestic loans. "The 
long recession since 1986 has not left banks unscathed. Their 
loan loss provisions have in fact been high." (Barnes, 1991) 
Danish banks "survived a long economic recession and bad-debt 
provisions mainly because they are better capitalised and more 
• 
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FIG.2:After-tax ROE- EC banking systems

Data source: DECO, Bank Profitability
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closely supervised." (Economist, 1992, p. 84) To account for 
this economic crisis, the dummy variable is set up with a value 
of 0 for every country and every year except Denmark for the 
years 1986 through 1989, for which it has a value of 1. 
IV. RESULTS 
The results of the regression are given in Table II. 
Overall, they are very good and seem to support the hypothesis 
that fewer restrictions or regulations lead to greater 
opportunities for profit. 
The two variables that do 'not perform well are the variable 
for GDP and the variable for capital. The variable for GDP 
growth (lagged one year) does not perform well in the sense that 
it is not statistically significant. No ~ignificant relationship 
can be implied between GDP growth and profits in the banking 
sector. 
The variable for the amount of capital kept by banks in the 
banking systems of each of the EC countries is puzzling because 
its positive sign is the opposite of what was predicted. 
According to the model, banks which held more capital were more 
profitable than banks which held less, while it was predicted 
that banks which held less capital would be most profitable. 
The rest of the variables turn out to be significant at the 
.10 level and they all have the predicted signs. 
The variable for reserves is negative and significant. This 
says that banking systems which held fewer reserves (or were 
required to hold fewer reserves by regulation) were more 
16
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TABLE II: REGRESSION RESULTS 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT / T-STAT.
 
RESERVES -0.1977 / 1. 9507*
 
INCOME 0.0016 / 4.9069*
 
GDP 0.0007 / 0.3105
 
INSREG -0.0125 / 1.4165*
 
CAPITAL 0.3496 / 1.7108*
 
ASSETS 0.0003 / 2.1483*
 
UKLOANLOSS -0.1472 / 6.4422*
 
DENMARK -0.0618 / 3.9454*
 
R2 (adjusted) ~ .63
 
*indicates significance at the .10 level or greater (with one­

tailed test)
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profitable. The variable for non-interest income is positive 
and significant. As banks expanded their range of activities 
from the traditional loan-making (or were allowed to expand their 
activities by regulation or the lack thereof), and therefore 
earned more non-interest income, their profits increased. They 
were able to take advantage of economies of scope. 
The variable for insurance industry participation is 
negative and significant, as predicted. Banking systems in those 
countries which allowed their banks to participate in the 
insurance industry were more profitable than those in countries 
which restricted bank participation in the insurance industry. 
Again, when they were allowed to participate in the insurance 
industry, they were allowed to further take advantage of 
economies of scope. 
The variable for average assets of the banking systems is 
positive and significant as predicted. Those countries whose 
banks had the highest average assets were the ones which were 
most profitable. They were able to take advantage of economies 
~ 
of scale. 
v. CONCLUSIONS 
As stated, the model is generally helpful in supporting the 
hypothesis that fewer restrictions or regulations in the banking 
sector leads to more profit. Those countries whose banking 
sectors were least heavily regulated, as measured by the 
variables in the model, were the ones which were most profitable. 
An important goal of this research was to infer, from past 
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performance, which countries' banks would be most likely to be 
successful, or profitable, after the integration of the banking 
sectors in the EC. In order to do this, I looked at the actual 
profits in the banking sector for each country for each year and 
compared these to the profits predicted by the model. The actual 
and predicted values, along with the error terms, are shown in 
Table III. 
The model predicted profitability well, as can be seen in 
Table III, for the banking systems of: Belgium, France, Germany, 
Spain, and the UK. This definition of "well" is rather 
sUbjective. What I did was to look at a graph of the predicted 
and actual values; these five countries stood out as having the 
least difference between actual and predicted profits. These are 
also banking systems which were relatively profitable. If the 
hypothesis holds that fewer restrictions facing banks, or the 
ability to participate in a diverse range of activities, leads to 
greater profitability, then these are the countries whose banking 
systems should have been least restricted. 
The two variables which measured diversity of activities 
were the insurance participation variable and the non-interest 
income variable. Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and the UK are 
the countries which allow bank participation in the insurance 
industry. I calculated the average non-interest income of the 
banking sectors of all countries, and then compared it with the 
averages for each individual country. The UK was well above the 
average, Germany was close to the average, France and Spain were 
•
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TABLE III: PREDICTED AND ACTUAL VALUES 
COUNTRY PREDICTED ACTUAL ERROR 
Belgium .06 .05 .004 
.06 .06 .006 
.06 .07 -.003 
.06 .07 -.015 
.05 .08 -.023 
Denmark .18 .15 .034 
-.04 -.04 .000 
.02 .02 .000 
.07 .06 .008 
. .02 .03 .008 
France • 07 .06 .009 
.08 .07 .017 
.11 .07 .032 
.11 .08 .035 
.09 .08 .004 
Germany .07 .07 -.004 
.07 .07 -.005 
: .06 .07 -.016 
.06 .07 -.009 
.05 .08 -.029 
Greece .11 .11 .003 
.17 .11 .054 
.14 .13 .009 
.08 .13 -.052 
.10 .13 -.024 
Italy .07 .09 -.016 
.99 .10 -.005 
.07 .10 -.030 
.07 .10 -.026 
.10 .10 .002 
Luxembourg .05 .08 -.030 
.05 .08 -.032 
.05 .08 -.027 
.07 .08 -.012 
.06 .10 -.031 
Netherlands .13 .08 .052 
.12 .08 .043 
.13 .08 .044 
.10 .09 .013 
.10 .09 .006 
•
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(TABLE III continued) 
COUNTRY PREDICTED ACTUAL ERROR 
Portugal	 .05 .07 -.020 
.04 .07 -.033 
.06 .07 -.014 
.07 .08 -.011 
.07 .06 .005 
Spain .08 .07 .011 
.08 .07 .009 
.09 .07 .022 
.09 .08 .009 
. .10 .08 .028 
UK • 13 .13 .003 
.14 .14 .003 
-.00 -.01 .007 
.16 .15 .012 
.00 .01 -.007 
... 
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well over half of the average, but Belgium was less than half of 
the average. So it seems that as measured by the insurance 
participation variable, those countries which the model predicted 
well for were less restricted, and as measured by the non-
interest income variable they were, for the most part, not the 
least restricted countries, but nonetheless fairly unrestricted. 
Given that the countries named above: had strong financial 
systems, were'the ones which were least restricted as measured by 
the insurance industry participation variable, and were fairly 
unrestricted as measured by the non-interest income variable, it 
follows that they should be the ones whose banking systems have 
the best chance of being profitable after integration, because 
they have gained experience operating in an environment of few 
restrictions. 
There were some weaknesses with the variables. For example, 
the capital/asset ratio, used for the capital variable, is not a 
risk-weighted ratio, because a weighted ratio could not be found 
nor calculated from the data. However, the capital requirements 
set by the EC use risk-weighted ratios. The problems with this 
variable could also be due to the fact that during this time, 
adjustments were being made in many of the countries to BIS (Bank 
for International Settlements) capital standards. 
The model does not account for cost differences due to 
differences in deposit insurance schemes. There are great 
differences in deposit insurance protection across the EC 
countries. There has been much debate within the Community as to 
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what to do about these differences. A directive has been 
proposed that would subject each EC country to a minimum ECU 
15,000 of deposit insurance protection per depositor. This is 
below the protection currently offered in the UK, Denmark, 
France, Italy, and Germany. Portugal and Greece currently have 
no protection, and Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg would be 
required to increase deposit protection to meet the ECU 15,000 
minimum. (BNA, 1992) Costs due to different deposit insurance 
schemes are· probably important costs that are missing from the 
model. Ideally, a variable would be included denoting the costs 
to banks of deposit insurance, in other words the premiums that 
they pay. If such costs could be uncovered in future research, 
the model would be enhanced. 
Another variable that is missing in the model is a variable 
accounting for banks' expansion into markets in the EC. If a 
banking system had already expanded into EC markets, its banks 
would further increase their opportunities for economies of scale 
and they would gain experience in operating in and establish a 
reputation in these markets. The extent of each banking system's 
EC operations, for all the years studied, could not be found. 
Again, if future research could find a measure for each systems' 
EC operations, that would improve the model. 
Certainly future research would also be affected by 
developments in the establishment of a common European currency. 
If the EC countries eventually adopt a common currency, their 
banking sectors would be greatly affected. 
23
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